Michigan Law Review
Volume 52

Issue 3

1954

Labor Law - Labor-Management Relations Act - Availability of
Injunctive Relief Under Section 301
George B. Berridge S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
George B. Berridge S.Ed., Labor Law - Labor-Management Relations Act - Availability of Injunctive Relief
Under Section 301, 52 MICH. L. REV. 455 (1954).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol52/iss3/12

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1954]

R.EcENT DECISIONS

455

LAw-LABon-MANAGEMENT R:sLA'IlONS Acrr-Av.AJLABILITY OF INSECTION 301-Plaintiff union brought suit in a federal
district court under section 301 of the LMRA1 to enjoin defendant employer
from violating a collective bargaining agreement by refusing to give effect to
an arbitration award directing the reinstatement of certain employees. On
appeal from an order of the district court dismissing the complaint on the
ground that the Norris-LaGuardia Act2 prevented the court from issuing an
injunction, held,. reversed. Section 301(a) of the LMRA authorizes federal
courts to enjoin violations of collective agreements, and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act does not forbid the granting of such relief. Milk and Ice Cream Drivers
and Dairy Employees Union, Local No. 98 17. Gillespie Milk Products Corp.,
(6th Cir. 1953) 203 F.(2d) 650.
Section 301 of the LMRA represents an attempt by Congress to make collective bargaining agreements equally binding on employers and unions by
providing a more effective means for their enforcement than was available
under the laws of many states.!1 To this end the federal courts were opened
to "suits for violation of" labor contracts in industries affecting commerce without regard to the normal jurisdictional prerequisites of diversity of citizenship
and amount in controversy.4 An examination of the cases considering the
LABOR
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lLabor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 156, §30I(a) (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §185(a). Sec. 30l(a) provides: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees :in
an :industry affecting commerce • • . may be brought :in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
2 47 Stat. L. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1946) §101-115.
3 See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 15 et seq. (1947).
4 For a discussion of the constitutional basis for section 301 and the problem of
whether federal or state law is to be applied thereunder see Wallace, ''The Contract Cause
of Action Under the Taft-Hartley Act," 16 BnooKL'ffi L. R:sv. I (1949).
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problem of whether section 30l(a) authorizes injunctive relief as well as a
damage remedy discloses that approximately two-thirds of the courts faced with
this question have indicated that they lacked authority to issue injunctions,5
while the remaining one-third have been willing to grant equitable relief.6
However, it appears that the conllicting results stem not so much from any
disagreement over the proper interpretation to be accorded section 30l(a) as
from the perennial problem of what constitutes a "labor dispute" within the
meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Almost without exception those courts
which have refused injunctive relief have based their decisions on the applicability of the Norris Act; 7 and, at least prior to the principal case, the courts
which have granted injunctions have done so only after finding that no ''labor
dispute" was involved,8 or upon determining that the procedural requirements
and other limitations9 of the Norris Act had been met.10 Thus there seems to
be little dissent from two basic propositions: (I) section 301 of the LMRA did
not accomplish an implied repeal pro tanto of the Norris Act; (2) when the
Norris Act is inapplicable or its procedural and other requirements are satisfied,
injunctive r~lief is authorized by section 301.11 These propositions appear to
represent a reasonable construction of section 30l(a), and both find support
in its legislative history. That Congress did not intend by section 30l(a) to
remove any of the Norris Act's restrictions upon the equitable powers of federal
courts seems to follow as a matter of construction from the fact that the Norris
Act was specifically made inapplicable to suits under several other sections of
the LMRA.12 The same conclusion is indicated by the legislative history of
section 301, for a provision in the House bill13 explicitly exempting suits for
breach of contract from the operation of the Norris Act was rejected by the
See cases cited in note 7 infra.
See cases cited in notes 8 and 10 infra.
7 Alcoa Steamship Co. v. McMahon, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 81 F. Supp. 541, affd. (2d
Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 567, cert. den. 338 U.S. 821, 70 S.Ct. 65 (1949); Castle &
Cooke Terminals v. Local 137, International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union,
(D.C. Hawaii 1953) ll0 F. Supp. 247; Textile Workers Union of America v. Berryton
Mills, (D.C. Ga. 1951) 20 CCH Lab. Cas. 1[66,519; Local 937 of International Union
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Royal
Typewriter Co., (D.C. Conn. 1949) 88 F. Supp. 669; Duris v. Phelps Dodge Copper
Products Corp., (D.C. N.J. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 229. An exception is United Packing
House Workers of America v. Wilson and Co., (D.C. ill. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 563, where
the decision seems to be based both on the applicability of the Norris Act and on the lack
of equitable jurisdiction under §301. The fact that the activity sought to be enjoined
constitutes an unfair labor practice as well as a breach of contract may result in a denial
of injunctive relief. See Levinson, ''Breach of Contract Under the Taft-Hartley Act," 2
LAB. L.J. 279 (1951).
s Textile Workers Union of America v. American Thread Co., (D.C. Mass. 1953)
ll3 F. Supp. 137; Mountain States Division No. 17, Communication Workers of America
v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., (D.C. Colo. 1948) 81 F. Supp. 397.
9 I.e., those contained in 47 Stat. L. 70-71, §4 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1946) §104.
10 Textile Workers Union of America v. Aleo Manufacturing Co., (D.C. N.C. 1950)
94 F. Supp. 626.
11 For a contrary view as to the latter statement see TELLER, Tm, LAW GOVERNING
LABOR DISPUTES AND CoLLECTIVll BARGAINING §398.163 (1950 Supp.).
12 See §§IO(h), 208(b), and 302(e).
18 H.R. 3020, §302(e), 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947).
5
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Senate-House conference committee.14 This congressional recognition that a
Norris Act problem existed in connection with section 30l(a), coupled with
the lack of any attempt specifically to restrict the operation of that section to
suits for damages, would also seem to indicate an understanding that, subject
to Norris Act limitations, equity jurisdiction was being conferred on the federal
courts. Consequently, to most courts presented with an application for injunctive relief for breach of contract the crucial inquiry has been, does such a
suit grow out of a "labor dispute," as defined in section 13 of the Norris Act?15
To this question there is no obviously correct answer. According to the letter
of section 13 there is no doubt that a labor dispute is involved, but considerations
of congressional intent , and public policy perhaps militate against a literal
application of this extremely broad definition to breach of contract cases.16
Although the rationale of the decision in the instant case is far from clear, there
is almost nothing in the opinion to indicate that the court intended to embrace
the theory of repeal by implication.17 Yet, on the other hand, there was no
clear statement of whether or not the court felt that a labor dispute was involved,
and if not, why not. 18 In fact, the court seemingly relied heavily on one of its
previous decisions19 which it was admitted did not even mention the Norris Act.
Thus the instant case is significant, not for an especially clear or persuasive
exposition of the view that injunctive relief is available under section 301 despite
the Norris Act, but simply because it represents the decision of the highest
federal court to have thus far indicated that such relief may properly be granted.

George B. Berridge, S.Ed.

14 Unfortunately, however, the conference committee report does not state speci£cally
why this provision was removed. See H. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 66 (1947).
15 Sec. 13(a): "A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when
the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation;
or have direct or indirect interests therein••.." See also §§13(b), 13(c).
16 For a discussion of the problem see 37 VA. L. REv. 739 (1951).
17 The rather ambiguous statement, "We think the unqualified use of the word 'suits'
in the Labor Management Relations Act authorizes injunctive process for the full enforcement of the substantive rights created by Section 301(a) . . . ," is about as close as the
court comes to indicating approval of this theory. Principal case at 651.
18 Thus the opinion seems to be equally susceptible of either of two interpretations:
(1) it was taken for granted that no labor dispute was involved; (2) it was felt that
although a labor dispute might be involved plaintiff could perhaps satisfy the procedural
requirements of the Norris Act.
19 A.F.L. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (6th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 535.

